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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that the most logical path is the one expounded by the principal
case, i.e. that there may be more than one cause of an injury, and
in such a case, the various wrongdoers may be jointly or severally
held for their negligence.
In conclusion, it would seem that the decision of the principal
case is correct and follows the weight of authority in the United
States. There certainly may be concurrent causes of an injury, and,
depending on various factors, one or both of the negligent parties
may be held liable for their wrongful acts. In cases similar to the
principal case, the West Virginia court has followed three trends of
thought with little consistency, leaving much confusion in this area.
F. L. D., Jr.
TORT-FATHER'S ACToN AGAINST AN UNEMANCIPATED SON FOR
Loss OF SERvICES OF ANOTHER UNEMAN CPATED SON.-B was injured
in an automobile accident while riding in a car driven by his brother,
D. The father of the two unemancipated boys brought this action
against D to recover for loss of services and medical expenses in-
curred by B. In a companion action B, by his father as guardian ad
litem, seeks to recover damages for personal injuries from D and the
driver of the other car involved in the accident. D moved to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds that an action by a father against
his unemancipated son is contrary to public policy. Held, the father
could maintain this derivative action, regardless of whether the
claim was covered by liability insurance. Becker v. Rieck, 188
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1959).
This case presents an unusual situation, one in which the court
was faced with an almost complete lack of precedent upon which to
base its decision. Thus it is necessary to draw conclusions in this fac-
tual situation by analyzing the cases in the field of family immunity
in tort actions, to determine if such immunity should be applied to
cases similar to the one under discussion.
At common law, spouses were not permitted to sue each other
for torts. Since most states have removed these common law disa-
bilities by the passage of married women's property acts, it has
been advocated that this removes all disabilities of married women,
and they should therefore be able to sue and be sued by their
spouses for torts. However, such is not the case, and the majority of
states, including West Vrginia, have interpreted such acts as not per-
mitting suits between spouses for torts. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293
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Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935); Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669,
286 N.W. 120 (1939); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d
912 (1945); Wright v. Davis, 182 W.Va. 722, 53 S.E.2d 885 (1949).
Illinois has by statute expressly barred actions between spouses for
torts. ILL. BEV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1. (1957).
The minority view, and perhaps the recent trend, seems to allow
tort actions between spouses. Combs v. Combs, 262 S.W.2d 821
(Ky. 1953); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912
(1952); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932). New
York has a statute which authorizes such actions. N.Y. DommsTic
RELATIONS LAW, § 57.
The overwhelming number of states do not permit an action
for tort by a parent against an unemancipated minor. Oliveria v.
Oliveria, 805 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940); Silverstein v. Kastner,
342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205 (1941); Parker v. Parker, 280 S.C. 28, 94
S.E.2d 12 (1956). The case of Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.
App. 1932) seems to be the only case where the court has allowed a
parent to sue an unemancipated minor.
Where the child has become emancipated, many courts will al-
low an action for tort by the parent against such child. Crosby v.
Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.Supp. 384 (1930); Detwiler v.
Detwiler, 162 Pa.Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948). In order to eman-
cipate a child, it is necessary that there be a complete severance of
all parental and filial relationships. Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553,
89 S.W.2d 751 (1936). Where the situation is reversed, most states,
including West Virginia, would not permit an action by an uneman-
cipated child against a parent for unintentional torts. Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 488 (1938); Securo v. Securo, 110
W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Cronin v. Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12
N.W.2d 677 (1944).
The reasons generally given for the family immunity doctrine in
tort action are that to permit such actions would disrupt family har-
mony and would promote family discord, Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217,
239 P.2d 933 (1952), and where the defendant is covered by insur-
ance, it would encourage fraud and collusion. Smith v. Smith, 205
Ore. 310, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
Other reasons advanced are that to permit such suits would en-
courage trivial actions brought from spite rather than merit, that
the injured party has other adequate remedies by criminal or divorce
actions, and that to permit such recoveries would in effect allow a
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wrongdoer to benefit by his own wrong, in the situation where he is
covered by insurance. For example, if a child is permitted to re-
cover from a parent, who is covered by insurance, the money would
probably go into the father's pocket, unless the court appointed a
guardian or placed the money in a trust.
]he reasons given for denying that such immunity exists are
that since recovery is allowed between family members respecting
their various property rights, as against one another, it should also
be allowed in tort cases, as there is no sound distinction between the
two, and the likelihood of fraud should not destroy the remedy as the
court. are as capable of determining such fraud in these cases as in
others. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
It has recently been advocated that due to the widespread cov-
erage of liability insurance, the reasons behind such immunity are
destroyed since the insurance companies would have to pay the
losses. If the companies have to pay the losses, it is contended that
such actions would not result in family discord, but that in fact the
payments would result in better family relationships since the finan-
cial burden of such recoveries would be shifted from the family.
Many courts have considered this argument and have rejected it,
stating that the possibility of insurance is of no consequence. Shaker
v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Schneider v. Schneid-
er, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207,
20 A.2d 205 (1941).
In cases involving other members of the family, only three cases
have been found which allowed tort recoveries between siblings.
The case of Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254 (1939),
allowed a 12 year old boy to recover against his 16 year old sister
for personal injuries resulting from her negligence. Bielke v.
Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932), allowed a nine year old
boy to recover against his twenty-one year old brother for personal
injuries due to the latter's negligence, even though they resided in
the same house; but this case involved an emancipated son. Emery
v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) permitted recovery by
unemancipated minor sisters from their unemancipated brother in
a tort action.
It appears that the courts have refused to follow the reasoning
behind family immunity in cases dealing with siblings. It is the
opinion of the writer that the doctrine of family immunity should
either apply to all members of the immediate family or to none at
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all. It appears illogical to allow tort actions between certain mem-
bers of the family but not others.
This brings us to the discussion of the principal case. In New
York, a parent may not maintain a tort action against an unemanci-
pated child. Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 201 Misc. 453, 106 N.Y.S.2d
481 (1951). However, New York courts do permit such actions by a
minor against his unemancipated brother. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939). In the principal case, the father insti-
tuted an action for loss of services and expenses necessarily incurred
as a result of the accident. The New York court allowed recovery,
relying heavily upon the fact that since the minor son could recover
damages and future medical expenses from his minor unemancipated
brother, it would result in very little additional family discord to allow
the father to recover also. The conclusion of the court has merit and
should not be criticized, as it has a controlling precedent (regarding
the rights of unemancipated siblings to sue each other) and such
precedents should be given due respect. Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass.
144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934). In the absence of such precedent, which
is the situation in the majority of jurisdictions, including West Vir-
ginia, it is the opinion of the writer that actions between unemanci-
pated siblings should be denied applying the same reasoning here-
tofore given for allowing immunity between other members of the
family.
It is asserted that tort actions between family members might
well result in many cases in family discord and dissension, and there
is ever present the imminent danger of fraud and collusion. To al-
low this type of action would result in the jury members' knowledge
of the defendant's coverage by insurance, due to their reasoning that
this is probably the only explanation of why family members would
be suing each other. It would thus seem that tort actions between
family members, including actions between siblings, should not be
allowed.
A. M. P.
ABSTRACTS
LANDLORD AND TENANT-PEBPET~rrIE5S-LEAsEHOLD EsTATE.-
Lease specified that it should be indefinite and terminated only by
tenants inability to pay the monthly rental or his decision to move
his business to another location. Tenant agreed and did build build-
ing on the property as well as agreeing to keep premises insured.
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